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INTRODUCTION 
With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),1 Congress 
intended to provide private-sector employees with the right to 
organize collectively for their mutual aid and protection in the 
workplace.2  However, the NLRA faces a tsunami of criticism, much of 
which highlights its inadequacies with respect to protecting collective 
activity among employees.  Scholars have noted that the NLRA has 
fallen far short of its seventy-four-year-old goal of protecting collective 
activity.3  In this regard, it has been referred to as “ossified”4 and as  
“a failed regime.”5  It has been accused of not being able to “keep[] 
pace with changes in the composition of the U.S. work force and the 
structure of U.S. production systems” that accompany globalization.6  
In fact, “[v]arious commentators describe the [NLRA] . . . as dead, 
dying, or at least ‘largely irrelevant to the contemporary workplace’—
a doomed legal dinosaur.”7  Consequently, many labor scholars 
contend that the NLRA “must be reinvented.”8 
                                                          
 1. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.  
§§ 151–69 (2006)).  All references to the NLRA in this Article cite to the relevant 
section of 29 U.S.C. 
 2. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights:  
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 62 (2007); Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685–86 (2008). 
 4. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527, 1530 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, Ossification]. 
 5. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2685–86. 
 6. See id. at 2686 (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 87–119 (2004)). 
 7. Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment:  Reflections on the Aging of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 570 (2007)  
(citing James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory:  Collective Bargaining Protections and the 
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 942 (1996)). 
 8. Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law,  
in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:  TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND 
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In light of the NLRA’s myriad limitations, some scholars have 
developed promising proposals to identify new legal bases for 
protecting collective activity among employees.  For example, some 
scholars advocate for increased state regulation of labor relations to 
address the NLRA’s inadequate protections of collective activity.9  
Alternatively, Benjamin Sachs has highlighted recent efforts to look 
beyond the NLRA—often referred to as “labor law”—for federal 
protection of collective activity.10  He has pointed to federal 
employment law as the “legal mechanism that protects . . . collective 
activity from employer interference,” thereby acting “as a substitute 
form of labor law.”11  For Sachs, the NLRA’s inadequate protection of 
collective activity12 has led to a “hydraulic effect,” whereby employees 
and their advocates are turning to employment laws, rather than the 
NLRA, to protect collective activity.13  Sachs illustrates how the  
anti-retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)14 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act15 have protected collective activity 
among employees in certain circumstances.16  Unlike the NLRA, these 
federal employment laws provide private rights of action for 
employees in federal court and relatively robust remedies for 
employees who are fired or who face other types of adverse 
employment actions in retaliation for making employment law 
complaints.17  Sachs persuasively makes a case that in order to 
facilitate collective activity among employees, the remedies and 
                                                          
POSSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002).  Other scholars have called for 
updates to the NLRA.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the 
“Company Union” Prohibition:  The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of 
Private Sector Unionism:  What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2007); 
Lofaso, supra note 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption:  State Laws 
Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990). 
 10. See Sachs, supra note 3, at 2687. 
 11. Id. at 2688. 
 12. The move away from the focus on the NLRA is due, in part, to recent 
limitations on the NLRA’s protection of undocumented employees.  See Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146 (2002) (limiting the remedies 
available to undocumented immigrant employees who experience NLRA violations).  
However, in the employment law context, undocumented immigrant employees 
generally have access to a wider array of remedies.  See generally Michael J. Wishnie, 
Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004) 
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the employment law remedies available to 
undocumented immigrant employees). 
 13. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2687. 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2003(a) (2006). 
 16. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2708–21. 
 17. Id. at 2690, 2708–31. 
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private rights of action available in anti-retaliation employment law 
cases should also be available in anti-retaliation labor law cases.18 
While promising, these proposals do not focus on one of the most 
important threats to collective activity:  state defamation19 lawsuits 
filed against employees and worker organizations that have engaged 
in collective activity to improve workplace conditions.  Employee 
speech that is sometimes fiercely critical of and offensive to 
employers is central to collective activity among employees.20  In fact, 
hard-hitting statements and “trash talk” are no strangers to the  
rough-and-tumble arena of private-sector labor relations.   
For example, in an Ohio case, an employer brought a defamation 
claim after a labor union passed out handbills referring to the 
employer’s general manager as a “Little Hitler” who was running  
“a Nazi concentration camp.”21  Even the United States Supreme 
Court has described private-sector labor disputes as “frequently 
characterized by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, 
unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, 
misrepresentations and distortions.”22  Not surprisingly, employers 
sometimes bring state defamation suits against employees or worker 
organizations.  These employers, like all defamation plaintiffs, allege 
that the employees’ statements were falsehoods that were shared with 
a third party and resulted in harm to the employers’ reputations.23  
                                                          
 18. Id. at 2746–47. 
 19. For ease, this Article refers to defamation, slander, and libel as “defamation.”  
See Developments in the Law—The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1612 n.9 
(1999) (describing defamation and its two types—libel and slander—as  
“any communication ‘that tends so to harm the reputation of another’”). 
 20. See John Bruce Lewis & Gregory V. Mersol, Opinion and Rhetorical Hyperbole in 
Workplace Defamation Actions:  The Continuing Quest for Meaningful Standards,  
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 19, 43 (2002) (“Labor disputes are hotbeds for potentially 
defamatory statements.”); Teamsters’ Leaflet May Have Defamed Employer, 11 NO. 2 GA. 
EMPL. L. LETTER 1, Sept. 1998 (noting that “a lot of ‘mudslinging’ goes on between 
the adversaries” during union campaigns). 
 21. Yeager v. Local 20, Teamsters, 453 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ohio 1983); see also Pease 
v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 150, 567 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(describing how a labor union member referred to an employer in a newspaper 
article as “crazy” and as “dealing with a half a deck”). 
 22. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966). 
 23. The elements necessary to prove a defamation claim vary state to state,  
but scholars identify general trends among the states.  See Nat Stern, Creating a New 
Tort for Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 81, 92 (2004).   
Stern notes, 
A defamatory communication is one that tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
persons from associating or dealing with him.  To state a cause of action for 
defamation, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s defamatory 
statement pertained to the plaintiff, was false, and was published with fault to 
a third person. 
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While there are no empirical studies of the number of defamation 
suits in the labor context, observers claim that employer defamation 
lawsuits are on the rise.  In fact, it is widely believed that employers 
are increasingly bringing defamation lawsuits as employees and their 
organizations turn to less traditional modes of collective activity 
through means such as union corporate campaigns and new forms of 
worker organizations.24 
This Article explores an underappreciated and promising NLRA 
protection of collective activity.  It elaborates the NLRA’s role as a 
defense in state defamation cases.  Specifically, this Article explains 
how the “NLRA defamation defense” frees defendants from some 
forms of defamation liability when the allegedly defamatory 
statements are made during labor disputes.  The defense has no 
effect on defamation liability in what this Article refers to as  
“more egregious” state defamation law cases.  However, the defense 
forecloses liability in “less egregious” state defamation law cases.   
It makes it harder for defamation plaintiffs to win their cases because 
it requires them to satisfy a heightened standard of proof.25  In this 
way, the NLRA defamation defense limits the ability of defamation 
lawsuits to serve as “a powerful weapon for shutting up those with 
whom [one] disagree[s]”26 in the labor context.  In other words,  
it reduces the likelihood that state defamation law will chill the free 
flow of speech and collective activity with the threat of monetary 
awards, sometimes in the millions of dollars.27  While all parties to 
                                                          
Id.  In the vast majority of states, truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim.  
However, in extremely narrow circumstances, truth is not a complete defense in 
Massachusetts.  See, e.g., Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).   
In Noonan, the court stated, 
[T]he defendant may assert the statement’s truth as an absolute defense to a 
libel claim . . . . Massachusetts law, however, recognizes a narrow exception 
to this defense:  the truth or falsity of the statement is immaterial, and the 
libel action may proceed, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted 
with ‘actual malice’ in publishing the statement. 
 24. See, e.g., Maurice Baskin & Herbert R. Northrup, The Impact of BE&K 
Construction Co. v. NLRB on Employer Responses to Union Corporate Campaigns and 
Related Tactics, 19 LAB. LAW. 215, 217 (2003) (noting that employers have developed 
new litigation strategies to counter union corporate campaigns and that these 
strategies include common law defamation lawsuits). 
 25. See id. at 218 (explaining that because of the heightened burden of proof, 
“employers are required to show malice (i.e., that the union had knowledge of the 
falsity of its statements) . . . [and] are also required to allege special damages, which 
must be pleaded with specificity”). 
 26. DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 5 (1992) 
(remarking on the role of defamation lawsuits in the media context). 
 27. Scholars have noted that Congress, by passing the NLRA, intended to restrict 
the chilling effects large monetary awards have on collective activity.  See, e.g., Eileen 
Silverstein, Against Preemption In Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1991) 
(commenting that, when enacting the NLRA, “Congress eschewed other 
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labor disputes who face defamation claims can take advantage of the 
NLRA defamation defense, this Article focuses on the use of the 
defense by employees and both traditional and non-traditional 
worker organizations to highlight an important aspect of the NLRA’s 
protection of collective activity.28 
This Article, thus, redirects our gaze back to federal labor law— 
in particular the NLRA—as a source of protection for both 
traditional and new forms of collective activity among employees.   
It uncovers the NLRA’s relevancy and adaptability to new workplace 
dynamics in a largely overlooked, but critical area outside of the 
National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) domain:  state defamation 
lawsuits filed against employees and worker organizations engaged in 
collective activity.  It argues that the NLRA has the potential to 
protect collective activity and remain relevant through its role as a 
defense in state defamation lawsuits against employees and worker 
organizations engaged in new forms of collective activity.  In this way, 
this Article joins the scholarship of Ellen Dannin and others that 
shows how some aspects of the oft-criticized NLRA, even as currently 
written, have hidden potential to protect collective activity.29 
Part I of this Article describes the emergence and sources of the 
NLRA defamation defense within the broader context of the NLRA’s 
speech policies and protections of collective activity.  This Part 
elaborates the Supremacy Clause underpinnings of the defense.   
Part II illustrates the underappreciated aspects of the defense’s 
protection of collective activity among employees.  It does so with an 
analysis of all trials and summary judgment motion decisions 
referencing the NLRA defamation defense available through the 
LEXIS legal database since the Supreme Court established the 
defense forty-two years ago.  Part III demonstrates the unrealized 
potential of the NLRA defamation defense and elaborates how the 
                                                          
compensatory and punitive remedies on the ground that collective bargaining 
cannot flourish in an environment of lingering acrimony and large monetary 
awards”). 
 28. While the remainder of the Article focuses on defamation suits against 
employees and worker organizations engaged in collective action, the arguments for 
the breadth of the defense’s application apply equally to employers who face 
defamation suits in the labor context.  For an example of a case in which the court 
applied the NLRA defamation defense to union-plaintiff defamation claims against 
an employer, see Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973).  
For employer free speech arguments and a critique of existing restrictions on 
employer speech, see generally Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the 
NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002). 
 29. See generally ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW:  HOW TO FIGHT 
THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006) (developing a litigation strategy to reinvigorate 
the NLRA). 
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defense may apply broadly to a wide range of new collective action 
strategies and new actors on the workplace-relations scene.   
For instance, this Part illustrates that the defense has the potential to 
reach union corporate campaigns as well as the collective activity of 
emergent worker organizations, such as worker centers, which 
increasingly serve as vehicles for low-wage and immigrant workers to 
improve their workplaces.  Finally, Part IV assesses recent proposals to 
enhance state regulation of workplace relations and highlights the 
unintended perils they may create for the NLRA defamation defense. 
I. THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE 
Prior analyses of free speech and collective activity in the NLRA 
context largely neglect what this Article will refer to as the  
“NLRA defamation defense.”30  The defense, and the free speech it 
promotes, has its origins in the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause.31  Because the federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land,” 
the Constitution blocks certain state laws from operating when they 
may conflict in some way with federal law.32  In other words, federal 
law—in this instance, the NLRA—“preempts” conflicting state laws in 
some circumstances.33  With its roots in Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Supremacy Clause, the NLRA defamation 
                                                          
 30. This is due, in part, to the fact that much free speech and collective activity 
analysis focuses largely on NLRB proceedings and the First Amendment, rather than 
on lawsuits outside of the NLRB.  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want?  
Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992) [hereinafter, Estlund, Employee Interests]; 
Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment,  
16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public 
Debate:  Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415 
(2003); Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons:  
Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act 
Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1621 (2007). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 32. See id. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 33. See David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine:  Hamiltonian Renaissance or 
Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 508 (1986) (“[T]he labor preemption 
doctrine . . . applies the federal preemption principles of the supremacy clause to 
labor relations issues.”); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 
2412 (2008) (describing the NLRA’s dual preemption doctrines and stating that 
“Garmon pre-emption . . . is intended to preclude state interference with the 
[NLRB’s] interpretation and active enforcement of the integrated scheme of 
regulation established by the NLRA,” and that “Machinists pre-emption[] forbids 
both the [NLRB] and States to regulate conduct that Congress intended [to] be 
unregulated” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976))). 
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defense is a judicially-created doctrine.34  One will not find the 
defense by reading through the NLRA itself.  In fact, the text of the 
NLRA is entirely silent with respect to its preemptive effect on 
potentially overlapping state laws, including defamation laws.35   
As one labor law scholar has noted, “Congress provided the tune, and 
left the lyrics partly to judicial improvisation.”36 
There is an evident conflict between federal labor law, here 
embodied in the NLRA, and state defamation law.  On the one hand, 
it is widely acknowledged that the NLRA promotes statutory  
free-speech policies that may go beyond what the First Amendment 
requires.37  In Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,38 the Supreme Court 
recently acknowledged that it has “characterized this policy 
judgment, which suffuses the NLRA as a whole, as ‘favoring 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes,’ 
stressing that ‘freewheeling use of the written and spoken  
word . . . has been expressly fostered by Congress . . . .’”39  The 
Supreme Court and scholars have repeatedly acknowledged that 
speech is important to employees’ NLRA section 7 right to “engage in 
concerted activities to persuade other employees to join for their 
mutual aid and protection,”40 and to their NLRA section 9 right to 
share “information and opinions” before a NLRB-supervised election 
to determine whether a labor organization will serve as their 
                                                          
 34. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239–40 (1959) 
(stating that the NLRA “inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state 
relations” in part because it was “drawn with broad strokes” and therefore “the details 
had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process”). 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006); see also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) (“Our task is rendered more difficult by the failure 
of the Congress to furnish precise guidance in either the language of the [NLRA] or 
its legislative history.”); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) 
(“The [NLRA] . . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from 
telling us how much.”). 
 36. Thomas S. Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes:  Preemption and the New Federal 
Common Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1967). 
 37. While I focus here on statutory free speech rights, the NLRA’s free speech 
policies undoubtedly analogize to the First Amendment.  See Frederick Schauer,  
The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1782 (2004) (stating that while “free speech ideas have been 
incorporated into some dimensions of statutory labor law, most of labor law proceeds 
unimpeded by the First Amendment”). 
 38. 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). 
 39. Id. at 2414 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 
272–73 (1974)). 
 40. Austin, 418 U.S. at 277 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279 
(1960)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157; Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the 
Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 737 (1997) 
(noting that NLRA section 7 protects “some rough and abusive language . . . as part 
of the inevitable high emotions that accompany labor disputes”). 
  
2009] THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE 9 
collective bargaining representative.41  In 1947, when Congress passed 
the Labor Management Relations Act,42 amending the NLRA,  
it added a specific provision protecting certain aspects of speech from 
government restraint.43  While the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments are 
often viewed as pro-employer amendments,44 they also provide a  
little-noticed protection of employee and labor union speech.   
NLRA section 8(c) clarifies that “views, argument, or opinion” cannot 
be the basis of a NLRA unfair labor practice “if such expression 
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”45  As the 
Supreme Court recently stated in Brown, NLRA section 8(c) “protects 
speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the 
NLRB.”46 
On the other hand, states have a longstanding and broad interest 
in protecting the reputations of their citizens from defamatory 
speech regardless of the context.47  Defamatory speech, thus, is a 
traditional area of local, rather than federal, concern.  In 1966,  
the Supreme Court acknowledged this federal-state tension, stating 
that, because “[l]abor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs[,]  
the language that is commonplace there might well be deemed 
actionable” as defamatory in some state courts.48 
Before 1966, the majority of lower courts resolved this federal-state 
tension through total preemption of state defamation law.49  In other 
words, courts largely interpreted the NLRA to require complete 
protection of labor speech from liability under state defamation law.  
The Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in San Diego Building Trades 
                                                          
 41. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 277 n.12; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
 42. Pub, L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.  
§§ 141-44, 167, 171-87). 
 43. In the comments to § 158 of the U.S. Code, Congress provided that the  
“Act June 23, 1947, amended section . . . by inserting provisions protecting the right 
of free speech for both employers and unions.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
 44. James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Human Rights:  Wagner Act Values and Moral 
Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 482–84 (2002). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
 46. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2413; see also DANNIN, supra note 29, at 109–10 (providing 
a persuasive argument that section 8(c) has the potential to protect union speech). 
 47. States, as part of their police powers, have the constitutional authority to 
regulate some aspects of speech that injure the reputations of their citizens.   
See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302–03 
(1977); see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 (1983). 
 48. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966). 
 49. Currier, supra note 36, at 2 n.7 (“A majority of the courts faced with the 
problem prior to Linn took this position.” (citing cases)); see, e.g., Sullivan v. Day 
Publ’g Co., 239 F. Supp. 677 (D. Conn. 1965); Oss v. Birmingham, 399 P.2d 655 
(Ariz. 1965); Chaffeurs Local 150 v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 2d 452 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1964). 
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Council v. Garmon50 served as a guide for many courts grappling with 
NLRA preemption in the defamation context.  Garmon did not 
specifically address NLRA preemption of state defamation suits but 
set out a framework to determine when the NLRA preempts state 
law.51  In discussing Garmon preemption, the Supreme Court has 
explained that the NLRA requires that “state courts . . . defer to the 
exclusive competence of the [NLRB] in cases in which the activity 
that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the 
protections . . . or prohibitions . . . of the [NLRA’s unfair labor 
practice provisions].”52  On the other hand, if the activity to be 
regulated by the state does not arguably fall within the NLRB’s ambit, 
it is “a merely peripheral concern” of the NLRA and is not 
preempted.53  The lower courts largely applied Garmon to find that 
state defamation law trenched upon the NLRB’s authority to regulate 
speech in the labor context.54 
In its 1966 decision in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 
114,55 the Supreme Court disagreed with the majority of lower courts 
and established a new type of NLRA preemption:  the NLRA 
defamation defense.56  A bare majority of Supreme Court justices 
struck a middle ground between requiring total preemption of 
defamation suits and allowing states free reign in this area.57   
Linn involved an allegedly defamatory leaflet that was circulated 
during a union organizing effort at Pinkerton’s Detective Agency in 
Detroit, Michigan.58  The leaflet said: 
United Plant Guard Workers now has evidence 
A.  That Pinkerton has 10 jobs in Saginaw, Michigan. 
B.  Employing 52 men. 
C.  Some of these jobs are 10 yrs. old! 
(8)  Make you feel kind sick & foolish. 
(9)  The men in Saginaw were deprived of their right to vote in three 
N.L.R.B. elections.  Their names were not summitted [sic].  These 
                                                          
 50. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 51. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 381 (1986) (“[Garmon] 
set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations 
are preempted by the [NLRA].”). 
 52. Linn, 383 U.S. at 60 (quoting Local 100 of United Ass’n of Journeymen and 
Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693–94 (1963)). 
 53. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243. 
 54. See Currier, supra note 36, at 2 n.7. 
 55. 383 U.S. 53 (1966). 
 56. See id. at 64–65 (ruling that “state remedies for libel” would be permitted only 
when “the complainant can show that the defamatory statements were circulated 
with malice and caused him damage”). 
 57. See Linn, 383 U.S. 53 (5-4 decision). 
 58. Id. at 55–56. 
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guards were voted into the Union in 1959!  These Pinkerton guards 
were robbed of pay increases.  The Pinkerton manegers [sic] were 
lying to us—all the time the contract was in effect.  No doubt the 
Saginaw men will file criminal charges.  Somebody may go to Jail!59 
Linn, one of the managers, sued several employees and the union 
for one million dollars in damages pursuant to state defamation law.60  
The defendants argued that the NLRA preempted the state 
defamation suit entirely.61 
After considering Garmon’s preemption doctrine, the Linn Court 
concluded that total preemption was not merited because states have 
a strong interest in regulating more egregious forms of defamation 
against their citizens62 and this type of state regulation had  
“no relevance to the [NLRB]’s function.”63  In other words, the Court 
concluded that states did not always have to defer to the exclusive 
competence of the NLRB because state defamation law addresses a 
harm (reputational damage) that is separate from the harms 
addressed by the NLRB (unfair labor practices).64  After determining 
that the NLRB’s role would not be injured, however, the Linn Court 
went on to conclude that the NLRA (and therefore the Supremacy 
Clause) required some circumscription of state defamation law in the 
labor context.65  The Court reasoned that state regulation of allegedly 
defamatory statements during labor disputes must be limited in order 
to avoid “dampen[ing] the ardor of labor debate and truncate[ing] 
the free discussion envisioned by the [NLRA].”66  The Court also 
sought to decrease the likelihood that defamation suits, which 
sometimes lead to “excessive damages,” would be “used as weapons of 
economic coercion.”67 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 56 (alterations in original). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 60–61. 
 63. Id. at 63. 
 64. See id. (reasoning further that “[t]he malicious publication of libelous 
statements does not in and of itself constitute an unfair labor practice” because the 
statements may not be sufficiently “coercive or misleading” to constitute a NLRA 
unfair labor practice); see also Gottesman, supra note 9, at 382 (noting that 
defamation preemption cases are not treated with standard Garmon analysis in part 
because “the state is enforcing a general law that happens to be applicable in a labor 
dispute, not a law focused specifically on labor relations”). 
 65. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64. 
 66. Id.; see also Healthcare Ass’n v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2006)  
(“Linn held that state defamation laws would be preempted by federal labor law if 
the defamation laws did not require malice and injury; otherwise, the defamation 
laws might allow ‘unwarranted intrusion upon free discussion envisioned by the 
[NLRA].’” (quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 65)). 
 67. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64. 
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In resolving the tension between the state’s interest in protecting 
its citizens from “defamatory attacks” and the NLRA’s promotion of 
speech,68 the Linn Court concluded that the NLRA requires a 
limitation on state defamation law in the labor context.69  Citing 
NLRA section 8(c) as well as the NLRA’s general promotion of free 
speech, the Court reasoned that requiring a heightened standard of 
proof—in other words, preempting some less egregious state 
defamation cases—struck a delicate balance between state 
defamation law and the NLRA.70  The Linn Court borrowed the 
heightened New York Times Co. v. Sullivan71 standard of proof for 
allegedly defamatory statements made about public officials72 and 
applied it to the NLRA arena.73  The Court in New York Times had 
concluded that, because the allegedly defamatory statements were 
made about public officials, the First Amendment required a 
heightened standard of proof.74  The Linn Court was careful to point 
out that, by referencing the New York Times heightened standard of 
proof, it imported First Amendment principles into the NLRA 
context “by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion.”75  
Thus, the NLRA defamation defense was required, not because of the 
First Amendment, but rather to accord with the NLRA’s free speech 
policies and therefore the Supremacy Clause. 
Linn’s heightened standard of proof for NLRA labor dispute cases 
requires a defamation plaintiff to show that a defendant’s statements 
were “a deliberate or reckless untruth,”76 and that the statements 
caused actual harm.77  In contrast, state defamation law outside of the 
labor dispute context often only requires the plaintiff to show that 
the defendant was negligent in making his or her untruthful 
statements to a third party and does not require demonstrable proof 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 57–58. 
 69. See id. at 64–65. 
 70. Id. at 62–65. 
 71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 72. Id. at 267. Three years after the Supreme Court decided N.Y. Times,  
it extended the protection to statements made about public figures.  See Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 73. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 65. 
 74. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (noting that the First Amendment requires 
“a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”). 
 75. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65. 
 76. Id. at 63. 
 77. Id. at 64–65. 
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that the statements led to actual harm.78  As the Linn Court declared, 
during labor disputes, “the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity 
[from defamation liability] provided it falls short of a deliberate or 
reckless untruth.”79  Moreover, according to Linn, even deliberate or 
reckless untruths are not actionable state defamation claims unless 
the defamation plaintiff can also prove that these untruths led to 
actual damages.80 
By establishing this heightened standard and therefore only 
allowing state defamation law liability in more egregious cases, Linn’s 
NLRA defamation defense illustrates a type of statutory “prohibition 
against punishment or suppression of speech”81 in the labor context.  
The defense protects allegedly defamatory statements from liability 
under state defamation law by requiring that courts adjudicate state 
defamation claims pursuant to the heightened standard of proof.82 
In 1974, the Supreme Court further spelled out the NLRA 
defamation defense in Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin83 and 
elaborated upon it through what many courts and commentators 
refer to as the opinion or hyperbole defense to defamation lawsuits in 
the labor context.84  Austin involved an ongoing union organizing 
effort among postal employees.85  After the postal employees selected 
the union as their collective bargaining representative, the union 
continued its efforts to organize the remaining postal employees that 
had not joined the union.  In a newsletter, the union published the 
names of these remaining employees under the heading, “List of 
                                                          
 78. Several cases demonstrate the difficulty in meeting the heightened standard.  
See, e.g., Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insulation Co., 464 F.3d 
651 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a summary judgment dismissal of complainant 
company’s claim that the union distributed a defamatory handbill); Davis Co. v. 
United Furniture Workers, 674 F.2d 557, 563 (6th Cir. 1982) (reversing a lower court’s 
decision in favor of the complainant company because the company could not show 
that the special bulletin distributed by the union was published with actual malice 
and knowledge of its falsity). 
 79. Linn, 383 U.S. at 63. 
 80. Id. at 63–65. 
 81. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 
114 (1995) [hereinafter Estlund, Free Speech]. 
 82. Regardless of the outcome of a state defamation claim, however, the NLRB 
may conclude that speech is protected or prohibited pursuant to the NLRA. See Linn, 
383 U.S. at 71. 
 83. 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (applying Linn to Executive Order No. 11491 and stating 
that “the same federal policies favoring uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in 
labor disputes are applicable here, and . . . the same accommodation of conflicting 
federal and state interests necessarily follows”). 
 84. See, e.g., Lewis & Mersol, supra note 20, at 45–46 (“Many courts, following the 
reasoning of [Austin], protected statements made in the context of labor disputes 
under the ‘hyperbole, rhetoric, epithet’ rationale . . . protecting hyperbole and 
opinion in labor disputes.”). 
 85. 418 U.S. at 266. 
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Scabs.”86  The newsletter also included the following definition of a 
scab from “a well-known piece of trade union literature, generally 
attributed to author Jack London.”87  The definition stated: 
‘The Scab 
‘After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, 
He had some awful substance left with which He made a scab. 
‘A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, 
a combination backbone of jelly and glue.  Where others have 
hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles. 
‘When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and 
Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to 
keep him out. 
‘No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool 
of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his 
body with.  Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab.   
For betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself.  
A scab has not. 
‘Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage.  Judas sold his Savior 
for thirty pieces of silver.  Benedict Arnold sold his country for a 
promise of a commission in the British Army.  The scab sells his 
birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an 
unfulfilled promise from his employer. 
‘Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict 
Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God,  
his country, his family and his class.’88 
One of the employees in the “List of Scabs” sued the union 
pursuant to state defamation law.89  In approaching this issue,  
the Austin Court reaffirmed Linn’s requirement that the defamation 
plaintiff prove that the defendant recklessly, or knowingly, published 
an untruth and that the untruth led to demonstrable harm.90   
The Court also clarified that, in the labor context, statements that 
cannot be “construed as representations of fact,” including 
“rhetorical hyperbole,” cannot be the basis of state defamation law 
liability.91  The Court stated: 
“[T]o use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the 
conventional give-and-take in our economic and political 
controversies—like ‘unfair’ or ‘fascist’—is not to falsify facts.”   
                                                          
 86. Id. at 267. 
 87. Id. at 268. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 268–69. 
 90. Id. at 273. 
 91. Id. at 284, 286. 
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Such words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to 
demonstrate the union’s strong disagreement with the views of 
those workers who oppose unionization.  Expression of such an 
opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under 
federal labor law.92 
Applying the standard, the Court determined that the union could 
not be liable under state defamation law for the “List of Scabs” and its 
accompanying definition.93 
Since Linn and Austin, the Supreme Court has not directly 
confronted any issues related to the NLRA defamation defense in any 
other case, but has frequently referenced it in other NLRA 
preemption cases outside of the defamation law context.94 
II. THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE AND THE PROTECTION OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY 
The NLRA defamation defense is an important protection of 
collective activity because it reduces the likelihood that state 
defamation lawsuits will chill the speech that is so critical to collective 
activity.  As labor scholar Thomas Currier argued in the late 1960s, 
the defense reduces the threat that employers will win state 
defamation law judgments against labor unions or employees 
engaged in collective activity.95  He noted that without the NLRA 
defamation defense, “the potential size of defamation verdicts and 
the possibility of frequent resort to state defamation remedies might 
otherwise truncate free discussion in labor disputes . . . .”96  According 
to Currier, while the NLRA defamation defense does not remove the 
threat of state defamation law entirely, it “reduce[s] the latitude” that 
courts have and “eliminate[s] at least some of the grosser anomalies 
that characterize the common law of defamation.”97  This is important 
because, as other labor scholars noted soon after the Supreme Court 
established the NLRA defamation defense in 1966, “[f]reedom of 
expression and healthy debate are equally indispensable and may be 
throttled by threats of libel and slander suits should they become 
weapons in industrial conflict.”98 
                                                          
 92. Id. at 284 (quoting Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos,  
320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)). 
 93. Id. at 286. 
 94. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413–14 (2008); 
Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 (1983). 
 95. Currier, supra note 36, at 29. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Committee on Labor Law of the Federal Bar Council, Concerning Problems of 
Defamation and Freedom of Expression in Labor Relations, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL.  
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Intercity Maintenance Co. v. Local 254 Service Employees International 
Union99 demonstrates the challenge of meeting the heightened 
standard of proof required by the NLRA defamation defense.100  
Intercity involved allegedly defamatory statements that a union made 
during an organizing campaign among janitors in Rhode Island.101   
In an effort to pressure the janitorial employer, the union sent a 
letter to a hospital that utilized the janitorial employer’s services.102  
Among other things, the letter stated that the janitorial employer 
“expose[d] its cleaners to chemical and biological hazards including 
HIV and Hepatitis B virus.”103  According to the court, the union had 
acted recklessly and had “made scant effort to investigate the veracity 
of these charges” before including them in the letter.104  However, 
even though the defamation plaintiff “succeeded in proving that the 
defendants . . . [were] lawless, marauding, disingenuous, character 
assassins who deserve[d] their comeuppance,” the defamation claim 
was not sent to the jury because the plaintiff did not “allege and 
prove specific or special damages” resulting from the statements.105  
Because there was a labor dispute, the NLRA preempted the  
less-exacting, more plaintiff-friendly state law standard that would 
have presumed damages without any proof.106  Instead, the plaintiffs 
had to meet the NLRA defamation defense’s heightened standard by 
alleging and proving that the defendant intentionally lied, or acted 
recklessly, and that the statements led to actual harm.107 
Empirical studies of news media defamation cases confirm that the 
heightened standard of proof makes it considerably more difficult for 
a defamation plaintiff to win his or her case.  When such cases are 
brought by public officials or public figures, the same heightened 
New York Times standard of proof applies as in NLRA defamation 
defense cases.108  In an early study still considered definitive with 
                                                          
REV. 101, 101 (1969); see also Lewis & Mersol, supra note 20, at 20 (discussing the 
effect of defamation lawsuits on collective activity in a more contemporary context).   
 99. 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 100. See id. at 90 (“[P]laintiffs who endure even malicious libels during a labor 
dispute must present evidence of harm from defamation in order to recover, 
notwithstanding the law of states such as Rhode Island in which damages would 
otherwise be presumed.”). 
 101. Id. at 85–86. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 89. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 89–90. 
 108. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–84 (1964) (setting out a 
heightened standard of proof in defamation claims brought by public officials);  
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (applying the 
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respect to this issue, scholars compared defamation cases in which 
courts required the heightened standard of proof (i.e., those brought 
by public officials or figures) with defamation cases in which courts 
did not require the heightened standard of proof (i.e., those brought 
by private citizens).109  This media study found that a defamation 
plaintiff was sixty percent less likely to win when the heightened 
standard of proof was required.110  More recent studies are consistent 
with this finding.  For example, a national study of summary 
judgment motions to dismiss defamation cases brought by public 
figures or public officials showed that courts, applying the 
heightened standard of proof, dismissed the claims eighty-five 
percent of the time between 1980 and 1996.111  However, in that same 
period, courts dismissed private plaintiff defamation claims through 
summary judgment motions only sixty-eight percent of the time.112 
This Author’s LEXIS legal database research and coding of all 
federal and state cases that cite Linn (from the date of the Linn 
decision in 1966 through February 22, 2009) further indicates that 
defendants are highly successful in dismissing defamation claims 
when the court applies the NLRA defamation defense.  While it is 
important to acknowledge that the vast majority of defamation cases 
never make it to the LEXIS database,113 some motions and trials 
related to the NLRA defamation defense do make it to the database 
and may provide at least some insight into the usefulness of the 
defense.  Defamation defendants were successful in winning twelve 
out of nineteen trials that required application of the NLRA 
                                                          
N.Y. Times heightened standard of proof to defamation claims brought in the labor 
context); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146–55 (1967) (applying the N.Y. 
Times heightened standard of proof to defamation claims brought by public figures). 
 109. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG & JOHN SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE 
PRESS:  MYTH AND REALITY 122 (Free Press, 1987). 
 110. Id. 
 111. David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches:  Reflections on Current Data on Libel 
Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 510 (2001) (citing Press Release, Media Law Resource 
Center, New LDRC Study Shows Highest Incidence of Summary Judgment Grants to 
Defendants in Media Defamation Cases (Aug. 1997), http://www.medialaw.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=News&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=717). 
 112. Id.  Similarly, between 1983 and 2004, media defendants won 71.4 percent  
of all motions to dismiss defamation cases that public plaintiffs brought against  
them.  Press Release, Media Law Resource Center, Motions to Dismiss May  
be Winning Strategy for Media in Libel and Privacy Lawsuits (Oct. 2004), 
http://www.medialaw.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_MLRC/News/2004_Bu
lletin_No_3B.htm.  In contrast, they won only 51.9 percent of all motions to dismiss 
defamation cases that private plaintiffs brought against them.  Id. 
 113. For relevant limitations on the use of LEXIS/Westlaw searches in empirical 
studies, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:  A Tale of Waste 
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1558–61 (2008). 
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defamation defense.114  Moreover, in six out of six trials where the 
court explicitly rejected the NLRA defamation defense, the 
defamation defendants lost.115  Furthermore, defamation defendants 
were granted summary judgment dismissals before trial in forty-four 
out of fifty-six attempts.116  This is particularly notable because courts 
are reluctant to grant summary judgment dismissals of defamation 
claims early in litigation, as such cases are highly fact dependent.117 
While the NLRA defamation defense provides important 
protection of collective activity among employees, this Article does 
not argue that the defense provides comprehensive protection of 
worker organization and employee speech during collective activity.  
For instance, the defense does not stop employers, employees,  
or unions from filing lawsuits in response to allegedly defamatory 
                                                          
 114. To find relevant cases, my research assistant and I searched “Federal & State 
Cases, Combined” on the LEXIS legal database for a citation to Linn.  We used Linn’s 
numerical citation—“383 U.S. 53”—as our search term.  The search yielded 698 cases 
that cited Linn.  After reviewing these cases, I then identified a much smaller group 
of nineteen cases in which the court applied the NLRA defamation defense to a trial.  
I coded each trial based on the highest court opinion related to the trial.  Thus, if a 
trial outcome was appealed to a higher court, I coded it based on the outcome of the 
trial on appeal. 
 115. The coding yielded six trials involving an explicit consideration and rejection 
of the application of the NLRA defamation defense to a defamation suit involving 
the workplace.  Hughes v. N. Cal. Carpenters Reg’l Council, No. A112272, 2007 WL 
1448746 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007); Hotel and Rest. Employees Union v. Zurzolo, 
233 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); J & J Constr. Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied 
Craftsmen, Local 1, 631 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 664 N.W.2d 728 
(Mich. 2003); Lundgren v. Pawtucket Firefighters Ass’n Local 1261, 595 A.2d 808 
(R.I. 1991); Caruso v. Local 690, 730 P.2d 1299 (Wash. 1987); Oetzman v. Ahrens, 
427 N.W.2d 421 (Wis. Ct. App 1988). 
 116. The coding yielded fifty-six summary judgment motion outcomes that 
applied the NLRA defamation defense.  Similar to the trials, each summary 
judgment motion was coded based on the highest court opinion on that issue.   
Thus, if a summary judgment motion was appealed, the motion was coded based on 
the outcome of the motion on appeal.  If the summary judgment motion was not 
appealed but the case later went to trial, the outcome of the summary judgment 
motion was separately coded, as well as the outcome of the trial.  A few summary 
judgment motions contained mixed results whereby the plaintiff won summary 
judgment with respect to some of the allegedly defamatory statements and the 
defendant won summary judgment with respect to other allegedly defamatory 
statements.  In those situations, the summary judgment outcome in favor of the 
plaintiff was coded, and a summary judgment outcome in favor of the defendant was 
separately coded.  Because nomenclature varies from state to state, a motion to 
dismiss was coded as a summary judgment motion to dismiss if it was based on 
something more than solely the complaint.  In other words, motions to dismiss based 
on the plaintiff’s failure to properly plead actual malice in the complaint were not 
counted as summary judgment motions to dismiss. 
 117. While the LEXIS data cannot speak to whether these defamation defendants 
were more successful than other defamation defendants where the standard was not 
applied, my data confirms that defamation defendants are highly successful when the 
defense applies. 
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statements, thereby imposing litigation costs upon all parties.118   
The NLRA defamation defense also does not protect employees from 
termination or other adverse employment actions resulting from 
their allegedly defamatory statements.  An employee could only find 
relief for these adverse employment actions through NLRA unfair 
labor practice charges at the NLRB119 or, in some states, through 
common law causes of action.120  Nonetheless, the NLRA defamation 
defense has historically protected collective activity by reducing the 
likelihood that the threat of state defamation trial awards will hamper 
speech during collective activity.  As this Article elaborates next,  
the defense also has the potential to apply to new forms of collective 
activity among employees. 
III. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE  
NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE 
The NLRA defamation defense has the potential to remain 
relevant in the face of modern workplace relations and new  
worker-organizing strategies because it can apply in a wide array of 
circumstances.  Linn, Austin, and other Supreme Court cases that cite 
the NLRA defamation defense direct courts to apply a heightened 
standard of proof to statements made during labor disputes.121   
The NLRA defines “labor dispute” expansively to include  
“any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of 
employment, or concerning the association or representation of 
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to 
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether 
                                                          
 118. For a discussion of defamation litigation costs in the media context,  
see LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 70 (1991).  For a discussion of defamation 
litigation costs in the labor context, see Paul More, Protections Against Retaliatory 
Employer Lawsuits After BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 
205, 222 (2004). 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). 
 120. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of  
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 332 (2005) (referring to the “dynamic body 
of wrongful discharge law” in the employment arena). 
 121. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270–71 (1974) 
(referring to the NLRA defamation defense as applicable to allegedly defamatory 
statements “published during labor disputes,” “occurring during labor disputes,”  
and “made in the course of labor disputes”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 
(1969) (describing the defense as applicable to allegedly defamatory statements 
“used in labor disputes”); see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741–42 
(1983) (stating that “an employer has the right to seek local judicial protection from 
tortious conduct during a labor dispute”); Local 926, Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681 n.11 (1983) (citing the defense and referring to  
“a malicious and injurious libel in the course of a labor dispute”); Farmer v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977) (referring to the 
defense as applicable to “conduct occurring in the course of a labor dispute”). 
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the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and 
employee.”122  Similar to the Supreme Court, the United States Courts 
of Appeals that cite the NLRA defamation defense refer to the 
standard as broadly applicable to allegedly defamatory statements 
made “in the context of,” “during,” or “in the course of” a labor 
dispute.123 
Additionally, the NLRA defamation defense can apply to 
defamation suits that spring from labor disputes:  (A) even when the 
NLRB would not protect or would prohibit the allegedly defamatory 
statements in a separate unfair labor practices proceeding; (B) even 
when the defamation plaintiff and defamation defendant do not have 
an employer-employee relationship; and (C) even when the allegedly 
defamatory statements are not made by or about a NLRA labor 
organization or its members.  Thus, the NLRA defamation defense is 
an aspect of the NLRA that can adapt to changing circumstances and 
can remain a relevant source of protection for collective activity. 
A. Applies Even When the NLRB Would Prohibit or Would Not Protect 
Allegedly Defamatory Speech 
The NLRA defamation defense applies in defamation suits that 
arise during labor disputes even when the NLRB, through an unfair 
labor practice proceeding, would not protect employees from adverse 
employment actions that flow from the statements, or when the 
NLRB would prohibit the behavior.  Employees may seek protection 
from certain unfair labor practices by filing charges against their 
employers with the NLRB pursuant to section 8(a) of the NLRA.124  
NLRA section 8(a)(1) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer to coerce or interfere with an employee’s right to 
engage in NLRA-protected concerted activity.125  Similarly, NLRA 
                                                          
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9). 
 123. See, e.g., Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw. Teamsters, Local 996, 302 F.3d 
998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to “statements . . . made in the context of a labor 
dispute”); Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 241 F.3d 82, 
90 (1st Cir. 2001) (referring to statements made “during a labor dispute”); Dunn v. 
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 1999) (referring to statements 
“published in the context of a labor dispute”); Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 88 F.3d 831, 
844 (10th Cir. 1996) (referring to “written materials disseminated in the course of a 
labor dispute”); Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers 
Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1994) (referring to statements that 
“occurred within the context of a ‘labor dispute’”). 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). 
 125. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization,  
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”);  
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to 
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section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
discriminate against employees for engaging in NLRA-protected 
concerted activity.126 
Although these NLRA 8(a) provisions provide certain protections, 
they do not protect every statement made by worker organizations or 
employees engaged in collective activity.  For example, the Supreme 
Court’s 1953 Jefferson Standard127 decision established that NLRA 
section 8(a) does not protect employees engaged in collective activity 
from adverse employment actions that flow from disloyal statements 
that are not sufficiently linked to the underlying labor dispute.128  
Nonetheless, as this Article elaborates upon below, statements may 
fall under the protection of the NLRA’s defamation defense in a state 
defamation law action even when NLRA section 8(a) does not protect 
employees from the consequences of these same statements in a 
NLRB proceeding. 
Separately, NLRA section 8(b) provisions prohibit labor 
organizations from engaging in certain activity.  Among other things, 
NLRA section 8(b) provisions make it an unfair labor practice for a 
labor organization to restrain or coerce employees and restrict labor 
organizations from some forms of pressure on employers that are 
neutral or secondary to the primary dispute.129  The NLRA section 
8(b) unfair labor practice provisions may prohibit labor organizations 
from making certain statements.  However, labor organizations may 
be shielded from defamation liability in a state proceeding for these 
same statements if the plaintiff cannot meet the NLRA defamation 
defense’s heightened standard of proof. 
The broad reach of the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly 
defamatory statements that the NLRA’s unfair labor practice 
provisions would not protect, or would prohibit, has its roots in the 
                                                          
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [the employees’ 
NLRA section 7 rights].”). 
 126. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer . . . [to discriminate] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization.”). 
 127. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 
346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
 128. See id. at 475–81.  In that case, employees made public statements about the 
poor quality of their employer’s television broadcasting after collective bargaining 
talks broke down.  Id. at 467–68.  The employer fired the employees because they 
made these statements and the employees filed NLRA section 8(a) unfair labor 
practice charges.  Id. at 469.  The Supreme Court determined that the employer’s 
termination of the employees did not violate NLRA section 8(a) because the 
employees were disloyal and the content of the statements was not sufficiently linked 
to the ongoing labor dispute.  Id. at 475, 477. 
 129. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). 
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preemption doctrine.  Linn extended the NLRA’s preemptive reach 
in the defamation context beyond activities that the NLRB directly 
regulates pursuant to the unfair labor practice provisions of NLRA 
sections 8(a) and 8(b).130  Prior to Linn, the Garmon decision required 
NLRA-preemption of state regulation when the activities were 
“arguably protected or prohibited by”131 the NLRA’s unfair labor 
practice provisions.  It did so in order to protect the NLRB’s  
exclusive role in adjudicating unfair labor practice charges.132   
After considering Garmon’s preemption doctrine, the Linn Court 
concluded that state regulation of allegedly defamatory statements 
made during labor disputes had nothing to do with the NLRB’s 
function; therefore, it was unnecessary to make an inquiry into 
whether the activity would be “arguably protected or prohibited by” 
the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions.133  Instead, the Court 
declared that the relevant inquiry for courts deciding whether to 
apply the NLRA defamation defense is whether the allegedly defamatory 
statements were made during a labor dispute.134  In arriving at its holding, 
the Linn Court explicitly rejected a narrow analytical focus on 
whether NLRA sections 8(a) or 8(b) would arguably protect or 
prohibit the allegedly defamatory statements.135  The lower court had 
determined that the state defamation claim was NLRA-preempted 
because, given the content of the statements, they “would arguably 
constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)” of the 
NLRA.136  However, the Linn Court disagreed with the lower court’s 
analysis and redefined the preemption inquiry more broadly as 
whether the statements were made “during a labor dispute.”137 
                                                          
 130. See Norton J. Come, Federal Preemption Since Garmon, 17 LAB. L.J. 195, 199–201 
(1966) (discussing Linn’s adaptation of Garmon). 
 131. The Supreme Court has referred to Garmon’s “arguably protected or 
prohibited by” NLRA preemption standard in a number of cases.  See, e.g., Golden 
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 (1989) (citing Garmon 
and stating that “state jurisdiction over conduct arguably protected or prohibited by 
the NLRA is pre-empted in the interest of maintaining uniformity in the 
administration of the federal regulatory jurisdiction”); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. 
Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394 (1986) (“As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption 
inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the 
NLRA.”). 
 132. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) 
(requiring that state courts “defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the 
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted”). 
 133. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63–64 (1966). 
 134. See id. at 55. 
 135. Id. at 63. 
 136. Id. at 55. 
 137. Id. at 63–65; see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 
(explaining that the Linn Court held that “an employer can properly recover 
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Moreover, although the Linn and Austin Courts were undoubtedly 
aware of the Jefferson Standard decision, they did not limit the reach of 
the NLRA defamation defense to NLRA section 8(a)-protected 
statements that are loyal and sufficiently linked to a labor dispute.   
As mentioned above, the Court explicitly wanted to divorce the 
Garmon “arguably protected or prohibited by” inquiry from the NLRA 
defamation defense inquiry.  Similarly, when setting out the NLRA 
defamation defense, the Supreme Court did not say that the defense 
applied only if the NLRA section 8(b) provisions would not prohibit 
those statements.  When the Supreme Court decided Linn in 1966, 
and Austin in 1974, it was undoubtedly aware of its 1947 amendments 
to the NLRA, which added section 8(b) and its explicit prohibitions 
of some labor organization activity. 
Another preemption doctrine developed in the NLRA context, 
commonly referred to as the “Machinists preemption doctrine,”138 
similarly illustrates the NLRA’s broad preemptive reach over activities 
that are not directly regulated through the NLRA’s unfair labor 
practice provisions.  The Machinists preemption doctrine 
acknowledges that the NLRA established “a zone free from all 
regulations, whether state or federal.”139  In other words, the NLRA 
preempts some state laws even if the NLRA takes only a laissez-faire 
approach to the state-regulated activity and fails to directly regulate it 
through explicit unfair labor practice protections or prohibitions.  
Thus, Linn and Austin preemption of less egregious state defamation 
claims (the NLRA defamation defense) falls in between the Garmon 
and Machinists preemption doctrines because it applies to allegedly 
defamatory statements (1) that the NLRB would separately protect or 
prohibit through the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions, and 
(2) that the NLRB would not separately protect or prohibit, as long as 
the statements were made during a NLRA labor dispute. 
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the NLRA 
preempts state law even when such law does not touch upon an area 
that is “arguably protected or prohibited by” the NLRA’s section 8(a) 
and 8(b) unfair labor practice provisions.  In Chamber of Commerce v. 
                                                          
damages in a tort action arising out of a labor dispute if it can prove malice and actual 
injury”) (emphasis added)). 
 138. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
 139. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (2008) (quoting 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., 
507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993); see also Machinists, 427 U.S. at 144 (stating that the NLRA 
intends some activity “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces” (quoting 
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971))). 
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Brown,140 the Supreme Court considered both the NLRA’s Machinists 
preemption doctrine and the NLRA’s speech policies.141  The Court 
determined that the NLRA preempted a California state law because 
it would have excessively limited employers’ free speech with respect 
to “assist[ing], promot[ing], or deter[ring] union organizing.”142   
The state law at issue in the case limited the kinds of statements 
employers could make about unionization but did not necessarily 
trench upon activity that was “arguably protected or prohibited by” 
the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions.143  In other words,  
the California law did not directly relate to an area that the NLRA 
protects or prohibits through its section 8(a) and 8(b) unfair labor 
practice provisions.144  The Court concluded that the NLRA 
preempted the state law entirely because Congress, intending a 
laissez-faire approach to some aspects of labor relations, largely left 
uncoercive speech unregulated.145  Similarly, in Linn and Austin, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to leave less 
egregious defamations unregulated by state defamation law. 
Finally, the NLRA’s definition of “labor dispute,” both on the 
NLRA’s face and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in analogous 
Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLA)146 cases, in no way limits the NLRA’s 
preemptive reach to activities that are “arguably protected or 
prohibited by” its unfair labor practice provisions.  While the 
Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the issue in the NLRA 
defamation defense context, the Court’s NLA decisions provide 
helpful analogies that underscore the irrelevance of the “arguably 
protected or prohibited by” inquiry.147  The NLA is analogous to the 
NLRA because the NLA and NLRA definitions of “labor dispute” are 
virtually identical and federal courts have interpreted the definitions 
                                                          
 140. 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). 
 141. Id. at 2412. 
 142. Id. at 2410, 2417–18. 
 143. Id. at 2412. 
 144. Id. at 2414–15. 
 145. See id. at 2417 (noting that while the NLRB “has policed a narrow zone of 
speech to ensure free and fair elections,” the overwhelming emphasis is on 
unbounded speech). 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006). 
 147. The NLA establishes a rigorous procedure that largely restricts federal courts 
from issuing an injunction in “a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”   
29 U.S.C. § 104.  The NLA states in relevant part that “[n]o court of the United 
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to 
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from 
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:  . . . (e) Giving 
publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by 
advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or 
violence.”  Id. 
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as consistent with each other.148  Moreover, similar to the NLRA 
defamation defense, the NLA’s partial protection against injunctions 
only applies when there is a labor dispute. 
In the NLA context, the Supreme Court has clarified that even 
activity that is “neither protected nor prohibited” by the NLRA’s 
unfair labor practice provisions can fit into the definition of a NLRA 
or NLA “labor dispute.”  In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. 
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n,149 union members participated in a 
work stoppage in 1981 as a protest against the Soviet Union’s invasion 
of Afghanistan.150  The employer requested an injunction to end the 
work stoppage,151 arguing that “the political motivation underlying 
the Union’s work stoppage” removed the controversy from the NLA’s 
“labor dispute” definition.152  The employer analogized to the NLRA 
and reasoned that because the work stoppage was politically 
motivated, it would not be protected by the NLRA’s unfair labor 
practices provisions and therefore did not qualify as a “labor dispute” 
under the NLRA or the NLA.153  The Jacksonville Court rejected the 
employer’s argument, stating that “[t]he objective of the concerted 
activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is [protected 
or prohibited by the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions], but not 
in determining whether the activity is a ‘labor dispute’ under [NLRA 
section] 2(9).”154 
B. Applies Even When No Employer-Employee Relationship 
Exists Between Disputants 
Unlike some aspects of the NLRA, the NLRA defamation defense 
does not distinguish between primary and secondary labor disputes 
and applies regardless of whether an employer-employee relationship 
exists between parties to a dispute.  Thus, an employee or worker 
                                                          
 148. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 
702, 711 n.11 (1982) (“[T]he definition of a ‘labor dispute’ in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 
29 U.S.C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with 
one another.”); see also Richard Litvin, Fearful Asymmetry:  Employee Free Choice and 
Employer Profitability in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433, 475 (1983) 
(“Nothing in the legislative history of the [NLRA] suggests that Congress intended 
‘terms and conditions of employment’ to carry a narrower meaning than it had in 
Norris-LaGuardia . . . .”). 
 149. 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
 150. Id. at 704–05. 
 151. The employer argued in part that the work stoppage violated its collective 
bargaining agreement with the union.  Id. at 706. 
 152. Id. at 708–09. 
 153. Id. 709–10. 
 154. Id. at 712 n.11. 
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organization engaged in a labor dispute can assert the NLRA 
defamation defense in response to a defamation suit even when the 
allegedly defamatory statements did not target a primary employer.  
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to differentiate between 
primary disputes and secondary disputes within the broader 
definition of a NLRA “labor dispute.”155  Specifically, the addition of 
NLRA section 8(b)(4) prohibited labor organizations from engaging 
in certain activities, such as boycotting and picketing, that are 
directed toward a non-primary employer.156  NLRA section 8(b)(4)’s 
publicity proviso clarifies that it does not “prohibit publicity,  
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the 
public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer 
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are 
distributed by another employer . . . .”157  Thus, NLRA section 8(b)(4) 
requires the NLRB to distinguish between primary and non-primary 
labor disputes.158  However, courts do not have to make such a 
distinction to apply the NLRA defamation defense to state 
defamation claims. 
Several cases demonstrate how the NLRA defamation defense may 
be applied even when no employer-employee relationship exists 
between parties to a dispute.  For instance, in Johnston Development 
Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1578,159 neutral employers brought 
defamation claims against a union after they successfully won an 
injunction against the union.160  The court applied the NLRA 
defamation defense to the neutral employers’ defamation claim and 
denied the plaintiffs’ application for relief.161 
                                                          
 155. See Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623-26 (1967) 
(discussing Congress’s 1947 amendments to the NLRA, which differentiated between 
primary and secondary disputes, as responses to the perception that the NLA’s 
“broad immunity” had led to “labor abuses”). 
 156. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006) (describing activities which constitute unfair 
labor practices for a labor organization). 
 157. Id. (emphasis added). 
 158. Other sections of the NLRA also require the NLRB to distinguish between 
primary and secondary disputes.  See, e.g., Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 
456 U.S. 645, 665 (1982) (applying NLRA section 8(e) to hold that “employees 
working for firms with whom a construction union has a primary dispute are 
protected against secondary picketing designed to force them off their current job”); 
N. PETER LAREAU, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:  LAW & PRACTICE § 12.05 (Matthew 
Bender, 2d ed. 2009) (“Section 8(g) also does not apply to a union’s picketing at the 
premises of a health care employer, if the picketing is aimed at the employees of 
another employer, present on the health care employer’s premises, with whom the 
union has a primary dispute.”). 
 159. 712 F. Supp. 1174 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 160. See id. at 1176 (explaining that the NLRB had previously filed an injunction 
with the court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)). 
 161. Id. at 1184. 
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Similarly, in San Antonio Community Hospital v. Southern California 
District Council of Carpenters,162 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit applied the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly 
defamatory statements made about an entity with which a union did 
not have a primary dispute.163  The union had a primary dispute with 
Best Interiors, a construction subcontractor of San Antonio 
Community Hospital.164  To put pressure on the subcontractor,  
the union displayed a banner outside the hospital that stated in large 
capital letters that the “medical facility [was] full of rats.”165   
The banner stated in smaller letters that the union had a dispute with 
Best Interiors.166  The hospital sued the union, raising state 
defamation claims and requesting that the court enjoin the union 
from displaying the banner.167  The San Antonio court found that the 
hospital met the NLRA defamation defense’s heightened standard of 
proof on the defamation claim and granted the injunction.168 
In Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232,169 the Ninth Circuit 
applied the defense even though the company that the union 
targeted with its statements had no employees at the time the 
statements were made.170  That case involved a union that had 
historically tried to “persuade” Hasbrouck, a sheet metal and furnace 
business, to hire members of the union.171  Hasbrouck refused to hire 
anyone at all and instead operated almost exclusively as a one-man 
shop.172  After the union placed Hasbrouck on a “Do Not Patronize” 
list,173 Hasbrouck brought a defamation suit and argued that the 
NLRA defamation defense did not apply.174  Citing the “history of 
discussion between both sides regarding the employment situation in 
plaintiff’s furnace shop,” the Ninth Circuit applied the NLRA 
                                                          
 162. 125 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 163. Id. at 1233. 
 164. Id. at 1232–33. 
 165. Id. at 1233. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 1235.  The court stated, “Because the injunction must be predicated 
on the Hospital’s defamation claims, the Supreme Court’s decisions in [Linn and 
Austin] come into play.  These cases stand for the general proposition that ‘libel 
actions under state law [are] pre-empted by the federal labor laws to the extent that 
the State [seeks] to make actionable defamatory statements in labor disputes which 
[do not meet the heightened standard of proof].’”  Id. (quoting Old Dominion 
Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974)). 
 169. 586 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 170. Id. at 692, 694. 
 171. Id. at 694. 
 172. Id. at 692. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 692–94. 
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defamation defense.175  It determined that the defense applied 
because “[u]nder the broad statutory definition, this was a [NLRA] 
‘labor dispute’ as a matter of law.”176 
Similarly, courts apply the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly 
defamatory statements made during union area standards campaigns 
despite the fact that those campaigns sometimes do not involve  
a direct employment relationship between members or future 
members of the union and the targeted company.177  Area standards 
disputes often involve union attempts to pressure companies in the 
same industry to meet “area standards” with respect to wages and 
benefits.178  In Ruzicka Electric & Sons, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 1,179 an Eighth Circuit case, such a dispute 
existed between International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local 1, which represents eastern Missouri electricians, and Ruzicka 
Electric & Sons, a Missouri electrical contractor.180  In the course  
of the union’s efforts to expose the company for paying 
“substandard wages and fringe benefits,”181 a union representative 
told parties who may have contracted with Ruzicka that Ruzicka’s 
performance on another project was “shoddy,” “dangerous,”  
and “against the code.”182  Applying the NLRA defamation defense,183 
the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Ruzicka’s 
defamation claim.184 
                                                          
 175. Id. at 694. 
 176. Id. 
 177. For examples of cases where the court applied the NLRA defamation defense 
to statements made during area standards disputes, see Barss v. Tosches, 785 F.2d 20 
(1st Cir. 1986), and Manchester Resorts, L.P. v. Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters,  
No. 02-CV-1987-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2392 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2003). 
 178. See Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful 
Secondary Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?,  
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 1525–26 n.37 (2006) (stating that area standards 
campaigns are “sometimes directed at issues other than organizing workers” and 
focus on targeting a company for “undermining the living standards of others in the 
area by paying their workers substandard wages or by patronizing those who do”);  
see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,  
436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978) (“[T]he right to organize is at the very core of the 
purpose for which the NLRA was enacted.  Area-standards picketing, in contrast, has 
only recently been recognized as a § 7 right.”). 
 179. 427 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 180. Id. at 513. 
 181. Id. at 514. 
 182. Id. at 517. 
 183. Id. at 523. 
 184. Id. 
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C.  Applies Even When No Labor Organization Is Involved 
Finally, the NLRA defamation defense applies even when allegedly 
defamatory statements do not involve a NLRA “labor organization”185 
in any way.  Under the NLRA’s definition of “labor dispute,” a labor 
dispute may arise without participation of a NLRA labor organization.  
Moreover, employees can engage in NLRA concerted activity without 
the involvement of a labor organization.  The NLRA, and by 
extension, the NLRA defamation defense, requires “concerted” 
activity by or on behalf of more than one employee.186  Specifically, 
NLRA section 7 grants employees a right to “engage in concerted 
activities to persuade other employees to join for their mutual aid 
and protection.”187 Nothing in the NLRA, however, requires the 
involvement of a labor organization to satisfy the NLRA 
concertedness requirement. 
In fact, scholars have noted that one of the “best-kept secrets of 
labor law” is that the NLRA even protects certain collective activities 
that are not aimed at forming a labor organization or bargaining with 
an employer.188  Both the NLRB and the Supreme Court have 
                                                          
 185. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006) (defining “labor organization” as “any 
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or 
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in 
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of 
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work”). 
 186. Thus, the efforts of one employee acting on his or her own behalf are not 
recognized by the NLRA and therefore are unlikely to fall under the protection of 
the NLRA defamation defense.  The NLRA defamation defense, however, can apply 
to one employee acting on behalf of other employees.  See 29 U.S.C. § 151; NLRB v. 
City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (concluding that a sole employee can 
engage in concerted activity in some circumstances); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. 
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (“It is not questioned that a conversation 
may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener, 
but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the 
object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some 
relation to group action in the interest of the employees.”).  For a critique arguing 
that judicial interpretations of NLRA section 7 are too narrow, see Estlund, Employee 
Interests, supra note 30, at 924–25 (“Section 7 is meant to protect employees who act 
together to advance the interests they share with their co-workers.  The notion that 
employees’ shared interests extend only to their wages and working conditions is 
compelled neither by the language nor by the intent of section 7, and should be 
rejected.”). 
 187. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277 (1974) 
(emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279 
(1960)).  The cases involving allegedly defamatory statements of labor organizations 
that were discussed in the previous Section of this Article assumed concerted activity. 
 188. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:  
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 n.35 (2002) 
[hereinafter Corbett, Waiting] (citing scholarship which notes that people are often 
unaware of NLRA protection in non-union settings).  But see William R. Corbett,  
The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act:  Maintaining Workplace Decorum and 
Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 27 (2006) (“The recent trends, 
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confirmed that the NLRA applies to some collective activity among 
employees that does not involve labor organizations in any way.189   
In 1997, for instance, the NLRB concluded that an employer 
committed a NLRA unfair labor practice by firing a non-union 
employee who had written an email to co-workers to gain support for 
a proposed change to the company’s vacation policy.190 
Because the NLRA is often viewed as the law of labor unions,  
the NLRA’s broader protections of collective activity, including 
speech, is often overlooked.  Cynthia Estlund has noted that: 
The NLRA is rarely used by and is largely unfamiliar to nonunion 
employees outside the organizing context.  But [NLRA] section 7 is 
a potentially significant source of free speech rights in the 
workplace on issues of concern to workers; it protects speech about 
unionization or other forms of employee representation, discussion 
of work-related grievances, and petitioning for their redress.191 
Regardless of the frequency of its use in non-union settings, NLRA 
section 7 undoubtedly applies to collective activity in workplaces 
whether or not there is union involvement.192 
While the Supreme Court has not directly considered whether the 
NLRA defamation defense applies to the activities of non-labor 
organizations, its consideration of the issue in an analogous situation 
suggests that the defense applies to new (non-union) forms of worker 
organizations engaging in collective activity.  In New Negro Alliance v. 
Sanitary Grocery Co.,193 one of the Court’s earliest cases defining what 
constitutes a NLA “labor dispute,” the Supreme Court considered 
whether the activity of non-labor organizations falls within the NLA’s 
                                                          
decisions, and appointments at the NLRB indicate that the NLRA’s future as a source 
of rights and protections for nonunion workers will be insignificant at best.”). 
 189. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15–17 (1962) (extending 
NLRA section 7 protection to non-union employees); Alex B. Long,  
The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in 
the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 941 (2007) (“On several occasions, the NLRB has 
reaffirmed that [NLRA section 7] protects non-union employees.”).  But see IBM 
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (overruling a previous NLRB decision which 
provided non-employees the right to have a representative present during 
investigatory interviews that could lead to discipline). 
 190. Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 244–45 (1997); see also Corbett, 
Waiting, supra note 188, at 287–91 (discussing the NLRA’s application to new forms 
of communication and technology); Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation 
and American Workers:  Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 
314 (2007) (discussing the protection of employee blogging about work-related 
issues in some circumstances). 
 191. Estlund, Free Speech, supra note 81, at 118–19. 
 192. See Corbett, Waiting, supra note 188, at 266–67 (adding that NLRA section 7, 
therefore, may be a source of “reinvigoration of the NLRA”). 
 193. 303 U.S. 552 (1938). 
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definition.194  It concluded that non-labor organizations that engage 
in labor disputes can benefit from the NLA’s partial protection from 
injunctions.195  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that a labor dispute may exist even when no labor 
organization is involved.196  The New Negro Alliance (the “Alliance”), 
a civil rights group, demanded that Sanitary Grocery Company  
(the “Grocery”) respond to racial inequities in its workplace by hiring 
African-American clerks in some of its stores.197  When the Grocery 
did not respond to this request,198 the Alliance sent a representative to 
picket with a placard in front of one of the Grocery’s stores.199   
The placard said, “Do Your Part! Buy Where You Can Work!  
No Negroes Employed Here!”200  The Alliance also communicated to 
the Grocery that it would initiate a similar picket at two other store 
locations.201  The Grocery requested a court injunction to stop the 
picketing.202  The lower court granted the injunction, concluding  
that the NLA did not apply because the activity did not constitute a 
labor dispute under the NLA, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.203   
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the dispute was a NLA 
labor dispute.204  The Court stated: 
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the 
part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal 
of discriminations against them by reason of their race or religious 
beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and 
equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or 
craft unions or any form of labor organization or association.205 
By holding that the dispute fell within the definition of a NLA 
labor dispute, the Alliance Court concluded that the dispute involved 
terms or conditions of employment despite the fact that the Alliance 
members were not part of a labor organization and “were not 
asserting economic interests commonly associated with labor 
unions.”206 
                                                          
 194. Id. at 559–63. 
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 197. Id. at 554–56. 
 198. Id. at 556. 
 199. Id. at 556–57. 
 200. Id. at 557. 
 201. Id. at 556–57. 
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 203. Id. at 554, 559. 
 204. Id. at 561–63. 
 205. Id. at 561. 
 206. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 
702, 714 (1982) (discussing the Alliance Court’s reasoning); Seth Kupferberg, Political 
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D. Two Examples 
It may be counterintuitive to some that the NLRA defamation 
defense can apply both to new union organizing strategies that 
intend to circumvent the NLRB and to new worker organizations that 
do not want to be considered NLRA-regulated labor organizations.  
Nonetheless, this Section demonstrates the defense’s broad reach to 
these contemporary arenas.  Specifically, this Section describes a key 
component of (1) new union strategies (corporate campaigns) and 
(2) the most common new worker organization (worker centers), 
and explains how the NLRA defamation defense could provide,  
and in some cases already has provided, protection for these kinds of 
collective activity. 
1. Union corporate campaigns 
Frustrated with the NLRA and the NLRB in particular, some labor 
unions have called for the NLRA’s retirement.207  In fact, “many of  
the more activist organizing unions have been selectively boycotting 
the [NLRB] for quite some time.”208  Due in part to their frustration 
with the NLRA and the NLRB, some labor unions have shifted  
their organizing efforts away from strategies involving the NLRB  
and are increasingly using “corporate campaigns” to achieve  
their collective activity goals.209  Corporate campaigns “involve the  
use of non-traditional methods to secure tactical gains in organizing 
and bargaining.”210 Estlund describes union corporate and 
comprehensive campaigns in the following way: 
The “corporate campaign” . . . seeks concessions from employers by 
targeting directors, customers, suppliers, lenders, and investors 
                                                          
Alliance and stating that the “Supreme Court extended the term ‘labor dispute’ in 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act beyond the terms and conditions of employment in the 
sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions. . . . [T]he 
Court found that the dispute was clearly over conditions of employment and stated 
that the Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the 
dispute” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 207. See Christopher Ruiz Cameron et al., At Age Seventy, Should the National Labor 
Relations Act Be Retired:  Proceedings of the 2005 Annual Meeting, Association of American 
Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
121, 137 (2005) (referring to debate among union lawyers about “whether or not to 
give up, if not on the Act, then on the NLRB”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 111, 119 (2008) (“Today, these campaigns are most closely associated with 
Change To Win and its constituent unions, chiefly the Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW), the Laborers (LIUNA), SEIU, the Teamsters, and UNITE-HERE.  
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 210. Id. 
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with publicity and other forms of pressure.  A broader term—the 
“comprehensive campaign”—may better describe campaigns that 
appeal directly to the public by way of rallies, pickets, speeches, and 
leafleting in public streets and parks, often with the active support 
of churches and other community organizations outside the labor 
movement itself.211 
Corporate campaigns sometimes use aggressive and potentially 
defamatory publicity as part of union efforts to pressure employers to 
agree to union demands.212  As one management attorney recently 
claimed, “[U]nions are increasingly engaging in . . . tactics[] such  
as . . . mailing defamatory letters about a company to potential 
customers.”213  Union tactics also include “embarrassing a firm’s 
executives and business partners” and publicizing union-initiated 
lawsuits and government complaints against employers.214 
Given the intensity and range of these information-based publicity 
tactics, employers—be they primary, secondary, or neutral 
employers—often find them highly offensive.215  Not surprisingly, 
union corporate campaigns have led to defamation lawsuits against 
unions and union members.216  Indeed, some argue that the rise in 
defamation suits against unions is a response to corporate 
                                                          
 211. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 4, at 1605. 
 212. See JAROL B. MANHEIM, TRENDS IN UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS:  A BRIEFING 
BOOK 16–17 (2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/ 
06union_campaigns.htm (listing common union tactics); Geri L. Dreiling, Fighting 
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 213. Tresa Baldas, Court Rulings, Regulatory Actions Fuel Labor Battles, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 
10, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005552022;  
see also Professional Janitorial Service Files Lawsuit Against SEIU, CLEANLINK, May 4, 2007, 
http://www.cleanlink.com/news/article.asp?id=6678&keywords=union,%20seiu,%20
lawsuit (reporting a statement made by an employer that company officials were 
“looking forward to seeing what a Texas jury thinks of the SEIU’s campaign to 
defame . . . our company”). 
 214. Jacoby, supra note 209, at 119–20. 
 215. See More, supra note 118, at 214 (“Creating a media spectacle that highlights 
the issues at stake in a labor dispute and embarrasses the target employer  
often involves creative appropriation of the corporation’s logo or motto.”);  
see also Paul Snitzer, New Union Tactics:  Mock Funerals, Lies About Dirty Laundry and 
Other Low Blows, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, March 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/New+Union+Tactics%3a+Mock+Funerals%2c+Lies+
About+Dirty+Laundry+And+Other...-a0177154490 (“Union-sponsored corporate 
campaigns against healthcare employers are intended to embarrass the employers in 
the public eye by portraying them as some type of ‘evildoer’ to be shunned.”). 
 216. See Cintas v. UNITE, No. 1:04-CV-00317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45435, at *3-6 
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 16, 2005) (referring to a defamation claim brought in the context of 
a corporate campaign); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor:  The United Farm 
Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing 
Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 1, 63 (2005) (noting that corporate campaigns often 
generate bad publicity which “may become the basis for a defamation lawsuit”). 
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campaigns.217  A recent newspaper article reported that employers 
believe defamation suits are merited as a response to such conduct  
as posting “nasty fliers and Internet comments” that unfairly  
harm employers’ reputations.218  The article further reported that,  
“as unions become more proficient in conducting corporate 
campaigns, more employers are willing to fight back by alleging 
[that] union tactics violate state laws against slander.”219  Also, some 
argue that “[p]robably the most common employer response to false 
and distorted corporate campaign tactics has been to sue for 
defamation under state law.”220  This commentary suggests that the 
stakes for an effective defense against defamation suits are 
particularly high today.221 
Despite widespread pessimism regarding the continued relevance 
of the NLRA for unions involved in corporate campaigns, some 
courts adjudicating cases involving union corporate campaigns and 
the case analysis in the previous Sections of this Part suggest 
otherwise.  In Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees Local 483,222 for example, a California appellate court 
applied the NLRA defamation defense to a defamation claim 
concerning union statements made on television that implicated the 
employer in illegal activity.223 
                                                          
 217. See Dreiling, supra note 212, at 18 (arguing that “pulling out the legal stops 
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 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Baskin & Northrup, supra note 24, at 218; see also Ray Stern, In Its War 
for New Members, a Labor Union Is Using Dirty Tricks to Turn Hispanics Against Bashas’, 
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Limits:  Some Proposals for Reform, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 667, 671 (2003) (referring to 
defamation suits, stating that the NLRB’s ability “to limit such conduct” has been 
“reigned” in by the BE&K case). 
 222. 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 223. Id. at 14–16. 
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In another corporate campaign case, Beverly Hills Foodland v. United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 655,224 the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s application of the NLRA defamation 
defense even though allegedly defamatory statements were made 
after the union organizing efforts had ended.225  In that case, the 
union’s public statements about the employer suggested that the 
employer was “unfair to black employees.”226  The food market sued, 
arguing that this language was defamatory and that the NLRA 
defamation defense and its heightened standard of proof did not 
apply because the statements were made after the termination of the 
union’s organizing efforts.227  The Eighth Circuit rejected the 
employer’s argument and determined that the statements “occurred 
within the context of a ‘labor dispute.’”228  The court stated that 
“[c]ourts have routinely found that a labor dispute exists in situations 
which do not involve any organizing activities by a union.”229 
The application of the NLRA defamation defense in the corporate 
campaign context demonstrates the continuing relevance of the 
NLRA defamation defense despite union attempts to move away from 
the NLRA in other areas.  Without the defense, union efforts to 
promote collective activity through corporate campaigns would not 
be protected from the full reach of state defamation lawsuits. 
2. Worker centers 
Worker centers often view themselves as alternatives to unions and 
NLRA labor organizations.230  These centers exemplify the typical 
form of alternative worker organizations.231  Janice Fine, after 
studying more than 130 worker centers in the United States, 
identified those centers as “community-based mediating institutions 
that provide support to and organize among communities of  
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low-wage workers.”232  The groups that worker centers focus on— 
low-wage workers and other workers in transitory industries—are 
often not strategic or feasible targets for labor unions.233  Nonetheless, 
worker centers and unions have engaged in collaborations in the past 
and may do so more often in the future.234  Because worker center 
members are often at the bottom end of the labor market, worker 
centers’ activities often target some of the most severe labor and 
employment law abuses through lawsuits, organizing efforts, and 
legislative advocacy.235  Moreover, worker centers organize some of 
the most vulnerable participants in the U.S. labor market, including 
undocumented workers who do not have legal authorization to work 
in the United States.236  Thus, for many constituencies, these centers 
represent a critical new institution that protects workers and 
promotes collective activity. 
A viable defense against defamation suits is likely to become more 
critical for worker centers.  Similar to union corporate campaigns, 
worker centers often use aggressive publicity and other forms of 
speech to pressure employers to change their employment 
practices.237  These efforts address a wide range of workplace-related 
issues, from wages and vacation time to health and safety in the 
workplace.238  Some of the actions of worker centers may offend 
employers and provoke lawsuits.239  Even though they are still 
relatively new entrants to the workplace relations scene, worker 
                                                          
 232. JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:  ORGANIZING NEW COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF 
THE DREAM 11 (2006). 
 233. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 355, 361–62 (2008) (noting the rise of worker centers in the context of 
weakening unions). 
 234. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing:  Creative Campaign Strategies 
of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 513 (2006) (“The recent 
historic split within the AFL-CIO presents a great opportunity for worker centers to 
forge new alliances with unions and become an integral part of the emerging new 
Labor Movement.”). 
 235. See Miriam A. Cherry, Working (with) Workers:  Implementing Theory, 41 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (2008). 
 236. See id. at 733 (“These worker centers usually assist low-wage or immigrant 
workers, the most underserved and vulnerable groups.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Redeye Grill, L.P. v. Rest. Opportunities Ctr., No. 117382/05, 2006 
WL 2726823, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (describing how a worker 
organization used “megaphones, whistles and a nine-foot inflatable skunk”  
to announce that it was filing a lawsuit to recover “stolen tips”). 
 238. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 
379–80 (2007) (describing the efforts of a group of Houston janitors to gain a variety 
of benefits). 
 239. See, e.g., Redeye Grill, 2006 WL 2726823, at *1 (describing the plaintiff 
restaurant’s assertion that the picketing worker organization was “motivated by the 
desire to drive business away from [the restaurant]”). 
  
2009] THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE 37 
centers and their members have already faced defamation suits in 
response to their information-based tactics.240 
One might argue that worker centers must qualify as NLRA  
“labor organizations” before they may take advantage of the NLRA 
defamation defense, and there is an ongoing debate over whether 
worker centers can be included as such an organization.241  If they are 
included, worker center activities would be subject to NLRA 
restrictions.242  Nevertheless, according to this Article’s legal 
analysis,243 inquiry into whether the NLRA defamation defense applies 
has nothing to do with whether the defamation defendant is a NLRA 
labor organization.  Rather, courts should apply the NLRA 
defamation defense to defamation suits against worker centers and 
their members as long as the allegedly defamatory statements are 
made during a labor dispute involving concerted activity. 
The allegedly defamatory statements attributed to worker centers 
and their members are often made during a labor dispute.  That is, 
those statements are often made in the context of “any controversy 
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment.”244  Scholars 
have observed that many worker center activities are also likely to fall 
within the NLRA’s broad definition of concerted activity for mutual 
aid and protection.245  Among other things, worker centers file legal 
claims on behalf of groups of employees, organize employees around 
their mutual interests, and engage in confrontations with employers, 
including pickets, walkouts, and boycotts.246 
Although an exhaustive analysis of defamation suits against worker 
centers is beyond the scope of this Article, worker centers have raised 
the NLRA defamation defense in at least two cases.247  In one case,  
                                                          
 240. The Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, for instance, has “faced  
a multitude of lawsuits for its activity.”  LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH FUND,  
PAPER WORK CENTER THESIS, THE WORKER CENTER MOVEMENT AND TRADITIONAL  
LABOR LAWS 17 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/lerf/ 
WorkCentersThesis; see also Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance 
Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1896 (2007) (stating that lawyers have defended 
worker centers against defamation lawsuits). 
 241. For an argument that worker centers are NLRA “labor organizations,”  
see David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:  Emerging Labor Organizations—Until They Confront 
the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469 (2006). 
 242. See id. at 499 (discussing obstacles that NLRA labor organizations face). 
 243. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 244. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006). 
 245. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 241, at 482 (referring to Jennifer Gordon and 
Janice Fine’s “recogni[tion] that worker centers do encourage pickets, organizing, 
boycotts, strikes, and other forms of concerted activity”). 
 246. Id. at 482, 497, 504. 
 247. Garment Workers Ctr. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506 (Ct. App. 
2004); Park v. Kor. Immigrant Workers Advocates, No. B154294, 2002 WL 938274 
(Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2002). 
  
38 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1 
for example, an employer sued several non-profit workers’ rights 
entities claiming, among other things, that the entities “defamed  
[the employer] by proclaiming in their demonstrations, leafleting, 
press releases and web site postings [that the employer] owed these 
workers substantial amounts of unpaid wages and other employment 
benefits for sewing clothes.”248  In the other case, an employer sued a 
worker center for its allegedly defamatory statements that the 
employer did not properly remedy wage violations.249  Among other 
things the worker center members stated, “Hey, Hey, Ho, Ho, 
Exploitation’s got to go,” in front of the employer’s restaurant.250  It is 
unknown how these courts would have responded to the defamation 
defendants’ invocation of the NLRA defamation defense because the 
cases were resolved before the courts adjudicated the issues.  
Nonetheless, according to the foregoing analysis, courts can apply the 
NLRA defamation defense in defamation cases against worker centers 
and their members regardless of whether worker centers constitute 
NLRA labor organizations. 
It is important to preserve the NLRA defamation defense, given 
Congress’s intent to protect collective activity and given the relevance 
of the defense to traditional as well as new forms of worker 
organizations and union strategies.  While perhaps not quite a 
“diamond in the rough,” the defense provides at least some 
protection for collective activity at a time when the NLRA is already 
gasping for air.251  Nevertheless, as the following Part discusses, some 
recent proposals for reforms, which are intended to enhance 
protections for collective activity, may unintentionally undermine the 
defamation defense and the important protection it provides for 
collective activity. 
IV. THE PERILS OF A NARROWER NLRA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
Proposals to modernize the NLRA such that it better supports 
collective activity in the workplace should take care to explicitly retain 
the NLRA defamation defense.  To illustrate this point, this Article 
shows how an oft-cited proposal to narrow the NLRA’s preemption 
doctrine may unintentionally imperil the NLRA defamation defense 
and its unrealized potential. 
                                                          
 248. Garment Workers, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508. 
 249. Park, 2002 WL 938274, at *2. 
 250. Id. at *3. 
 251. See Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 101–10 
(1993) (describing the decline of the NLRA). 
  
2009] THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE 39 
A. Prior Scholarship on the NLRA’s Preemption Doctrine 
While most scholarship on NLRA’s preemption of state law has 
historically argued for a broad reading of NLRA preemption and, 
therefore, for leaving little room for state regulation of labor 
relations,252 some have recently criticized the breadth of the NLRA’s 
preemptive reach and have called for increased state law 
intervention.253  Historically, many labor scholars argued that the 
NLRA’s policies promoting collective activity were best served by a 
uniform federal regime of regulation that would minimize local-level 
inexperience with, and biases against, collective activity among 
employees.254  More recently, however, some have called for 
decreased NLRA preemption of state laws, often focusing on the 
opportunities less preemption would create for state legislation 
aimed at fostering collective activity in more labor-friendly states.255  
Moreover, a few such calls contend that broad readings of NLRA 
preemption often “block[] . . . state common law innovation”256 that 
could foster collective activity among employees in the workplace. 
These scholars, however, often do not specifically address how a 
simplistic application of a narrower NLRA preemption doctrine, 
albeit intended to promote collective activity, may unintentionally 
decrease the availability of the NLRA defamation defense.   
This oversight may in part be due to the fact that the Supreme 
Court’s Linn and Austin cases are often cited as exceptions to the 
NLRA’s broad preemption doctrine.257  Thus, those calling for further 
narrowing of the NLRA’s preemption doctrine may assume that the 
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Labor Law:  The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183 
(2003). 
 254. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 
542, 542 (1959) (arguing that labor regulation should be an “exclusive, nation-wide 
regime” and that state intervention should be minimal). 
 255. See Secunda, supra note 253, at 231–48; see also Silverstein, supra note 27, at 3 
(calling for scholars to “rethink the traditional belief in strong federal preemption as 
beneficial for organized labor and as necessary to promote collective bargaining”). 
 256. See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 4, at 1530–31 (referring to scholarship 
that calls for common law protection of collective activity). 
 257. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 27, at 21–22. 
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defamation context would proceed unaltered by a new doctrine that 
further narrows NLRA preemption.  But, the Supreme Court’s Linn 
and Austin decisions did not simply present an exception to broad 
preemption.  Rather, those decisions affirm that, while the NLRA 
defamation defense is narrow in that it does not preempt egregious 
defamation cases, it is broad in that it does entirely preempt less 
egregious defamation cases. 
B. The Continuum Proposal 
According to an oft-cited proposal for narrowing the NLRA 
preemption doctrine to better protect collective activity—referred to 
here as the “continuum proposal”—states should be “free to regulate 
labor relations, in parallel with the NLRA and beyond, except where 
state law conflicts with an interest protected by the NLRA or where 
there is a continuum of federal protection-prohibition across the 
subject area to which the state law applies.”258  Accordingly, the NLRA 
should continue to preempt state regulation of activities that 
Congress intended the NLRA to regulate, in every situation, through 
explicit protections or prohibitions.  For example, under the 
continuum proposal, the NLRA should continue to preempt 
picketing because all picketing activity is either explicitly protected by 
or explicitly prohibited by the NLRA.  Picketing thus falls on the 
continuum of federal protection or prohibition.259 
On the other hand, this proposal recommends that the NLRA 
should not preempt state regulatory interventions regarding activities 
that Congress did not intend the NLRA to directly regulate in every 
circumstance.260  These activities, such as union access to an 
employer’s premises, do not fall on the protected or prohibited 
continuum.261  Sometimes union access to an employer’s premises is 
neither explicitly protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.262  States, 
according to this view, should be able to fully regulate the “area 
                                                          
 258. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 426 (emphasis added).  Scholars have widely 
cited Gottesman’s NLRA preemption proposal.  See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Michael 
M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1502, 1507 n.20 (2008); Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship in an Era 
of Decline, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 271, 343 (1994); David A. Morand, Questioning the 
Preemption Doctrine:  Opportunities for State-Level Labor Law Initiatives, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. 
L. 35, 52 (1995); Secunda, supra note 253, at 213. 
 259. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 357. 
 260. Id. at 359–60. 
 261. Id. at 359. 
 262. Id. at 358. 
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beyond” those that the federal government comprehensively 
regulates.263 
Yet, encouraging courts to engage in this type of NLRA 
preemption analysis could unintentionally lead to the deterioration 
of the NLRA defamation defense.  This is because such an analysis of 
whether an activity is protected or prohibited by the NLRA is difficult 
in the common law world of state defamation law.  Currently, state 
courts must consider whether the allegedly defamatory statements 
were made during a labor dispute in order to decide whether to 
apply the NLRA defamation defense.264  But a simplistic application of 
the continuum proposal may lead courts to inquire, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether the NLRB would protect or prohibit particular 
statements.  Speech is sometimes NLRB-regulated and is sometimes 
entirely unregulated by the NLRB.  The proposal could, therefore, 
unintentionally lead courts to assess whether the NLRA’s unfair labor 
practice provisions under NLRA section 8(a) or 8(b) would “arguably 
protect or prohibit” the allegedly defamatory speech in order to 
decide whether to apply the NLRA defamation defense.  This would 
entail a hypothetical analysis similar to the following:  if an employee 
experienced an adverse employment action because of allegedly 
defamatory statements, would the NLRB interpret the NLRA’s unfair 
labor practice provisions to protect that employee from the adverse 
employment action?  If the answer is yes, the activity is federally 
regulated by the NLRA and NLRA defamation defense would apply.  
If the answer is no, the activity is not federally regulated and the 
NLRA defamation defense would not apply.  But as the cases 
discussed in the following section illustrate, such an analysis 
jeopardizes the viability and potential of the NLRA defamation 
defense. 
C. Case Studies 
In three recent defamation cases in the labor context, state trial 
courts erroneously inquired whether the allegedly defamatory speech 
at issue was “arguably protected or prohibited by” the NLRA’s unfair 
labor practice provisions in order to determine whether they should 
                                                          
 263. Id. at 360; see also Secunda, supra note 253, at 213 (summarizing succinctly the 
continuum proposal, noting that “federal labor laws come in two varieties—those 
where the entire field is occupied by federal law (‘conduct on a continuum’) and 
those areas where the federal law just provides some restrictions (‘conduct not on a 
continuum’)”). 
 264. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Budak, No. 2007-T-0033, 2008 WL 2332543, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 6, 2008) (applying the NLRA defamation defense after determining that 
there was a labor dispute). 
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apply the defamation defense.265  These cases illustrate the potential 
perils of applying the continuum proposal to the defamation context.  
These three courts applied an equivalent of the continuum proposal.  
As a result, in all three instances the courts did not apply the NLRA 
defamation defense and its heightened standard of proof to the 
defamation claims.  All three cases resulted in unfavorable jury 
outcomes, at least initially, for the defendants.  Viewed together, 
these examples demonstrate that proposals like the continuum 
proposal could result in reduced application of the NLRA 
defamation defense and increased unpredictability as to whether a 
court will apply the defense.  Both of these dynamics threaten to 
further chill speech and accompanying collective activity in the NLRA 
context.266 
1. Maki 
In J. Maki Construction Co. v. Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters,267 
the trial court concluded that the NLRA defamation defense did not 
apply because the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions would not 
protect an employee from adverse employment actions flowing from 
the allegedly defamatory statements.268  In Maki, a union engaging in 
an area standards labor dispute with a construction company made 
allegedly defamatory statements about the company on a handbill 
that it distributed to the public.269  The handbill contained a limerick, 
which referenced the dispute and stated that the company’s work 
                                                          
 265. Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE, No. 2:05-CV-1081, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20892, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005), remanded, No. SCV17938 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), 
appeal filed, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008); Hughes v. N. Cal. Carpenters 
Reg’l Council, No. A112272, 2007 WL 1448746, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007);  
J. Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Maki II), 882 N.E.2d 1173, 
1176–77 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 889 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 2008). 
 266. For a case explicitly rejecting reasoning similar to the continuum proposal, 
see Raffensberger v. Moran, 485 A.2d 447, 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).  In that case, 
the court rejected a proposal that the court consider whether the allegedly 
defamatory statements at issue in that case fell on a protected-prohibited continuum.  
Id. at 451.  The court stated, “Clearly, Linn is not limited to situations involving the 
provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.  The application of Linn, rather, turns on 
the scope of the judicial definition of a ‘labor dispute’ in the context of a libel case.”  
For a similar critique regarding the “vagaries of judicial line-drawing” in a different 
context, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:  The Perils of an 
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).  Estlund argues 
that a First Amendment analysis that requires courts to determine whether matters 
are of public concern “looms as a significant threat to freedom of speech.”  Id. at 3. 
 267. 882 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 268. Id. at 1181. 
 269. Id. at 1177. 
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product was, among other things, “crappy.”270  The trial court refused 
to apply the NLRA defamation defense, stating that there was no 
“connection between the handbill and the existence of a labor 
dispute.”271  In doing so, the trial court drew a parallel to the Supreme 
Court’s Jefferson Standard case, which found no NLRA section 8(a) 
protection for adverse employment actions flowing from disloyal 
speech unconnected to an ongoing labor dispute.272 
The trial court determined that NLRA section 8(a) would not 
protect adverse employment actions flowing from the allegedly 
defamatory statement in a hypothetical NLRB case, which meant that 
the NLRA defamation defense did not protect the statement in the 
defamation case.273  The Maki jury ordered the union defendants  
to pay $2,353,000 in damages, “the highest [jury award] in Illinois 
outside of [the Chicago area] to be reported . . . since 1985.”274   
The Appellate Court of Illinois, however, overturned the trial court’s 
ruling.275  Referring to the NLRA defamation defense, the appeals 
court concluded that, similar to the statements in Austin, the use of 
the word “crappy” was made in a “loose, figurative sense” and could 
not be the basis for defamation liability.276 
2. Sutter Health 
In Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE,277 the trial court employed similar 
logic and determined that the NLRA defamation defense did not 
apply.278  In Sutter Health, a union that was engaged in a labor dispute 
with a laundry subcontractor made allegedly defamatory statements 
about the subcontractor and its major clients, Sutter Health and 
                                                          
 270. See id. (noting that the bottom of the handbill stated that “[t]he Carpenters 
Union is currently engaged in a labor dispute with Maki Construction over the 
payment of substandard wages and benefits”). 
 271. Id. at 1182.  The trial court reasoned that Linn did not apply to “statements 
made during the course of a labor dispute that had no rational relationship to the 
subject matter of the dispute.”  J. Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of 
Carpenters (Maki I), No. 05 L 503, 2007 WL 1108443 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2007) 
(citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)). 
 272. Maki I, 2007 WL 1108443 (citing Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464 (1953)). 
 273. Id. 
 274. John Flynn Rooney, Lake County Jury Hammers Union for Defaming Builder,  
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 2006, at 1; Barbara Rose, Union Defamed Builder,  
Jury Finds; Carpenters Ordered to Pay $2.35 Million, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2006, at C1. 
 275. Maki II, 882 N.E.2d at 1183. 
 276. Id. at 1184. 
 277. No. 2:05-CV-1081, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2005), remanded, No. SCV17938 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), appeal filed, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2008).  UNITE HERE unsuccessfully tried to remove the case to federal 
court, arguing that the federal court had jurisdiction over the secondary boycott 
claims.  See id. at *2. 
 278. Id. at *9. 
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Sutter hospitals.279  In a postcard, the union referenced its labor 
dispute with the subcontractor and alleged that the linens in the 
hospital’s birthing center may contain “blood, feces, and harmful 
pathogens.”280  The bottom of the postcard stated in smaller typeface 
that UNITE HERE was currently “engaged in a labor dispute with 
Angelica Textile Services,” the primary linen subcontractor for 
Sutter.281 
It appears that the Sutter Health trial court refused to apply the 
NLRA defamation defense to the allegedly defamatory statements in 
part because it determined that NLRA section 8(a) would not protect 
the statements.282  It also reasoned that, because NLRA section 8(b) 
would prohibit the statements about a neutral party (the hospital), 
the NLRA defamation defense could not be applied to those 
statements in a defamation case.283  The jury returned a $17 million 
verdict favorable to Sutter.284  The union is currently appealing the 
award, which is “one of the highest ever awarded against a labor 
union in the United States.”285  UNITE HERE is requesting that a 
California appellate court either reverse the verdict and enter 
judgment for the union, or reverse and remand for a new trial based 
on the heightened standard required by the NLRA’s partial 
protection of defamatory speech doctrine.286  As of the date this 
Article went to print, the appeal is still pending.287 
                                                          
 279. Id. at *2.  Sutter Health involved a union’s efforts to pressure Angelica Textile 
Services to accept recognition of the union.  Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening 
Brief at *1, Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 
2008), 2008 WL 2478283.  According to the union-defendant, which represented 
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 280. Sutter Health, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *4. 
 281. Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening Brief, supra note 279, at Exh. A. 
 282. The Sutter Health trial court agreed with Sutter that no NLRA labor dispute 
existed under the circumstances and declined to charge the jury to apply the 
heightened standard of proof.  2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *1–2, *5–8, *15–19.  
Sutter had argued that there was no NLRA labor dispute because the union 
statements, (1) discussed something other than working conditions or a labor 
dispute, and (2) were made about an employer (Sutter) with whom the union did 
not have a primary labor dispute.  Id. at *15–19. 
 283. Id. at *1–2, *5–8, *15–19. 
 284. See Union Must Pay Millions in Defamation Case, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at B4 
(reporting the $17.3 million jury award in Sutter). 
 285. Mehul Srivastava, Jury Award Stings Union:  UNITE Here Hit With $17.2 Million 
Decision in Sutter Defamation Suit, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2006, at A1 (stating that if 
the jury award is affirmed, it could “cripple” the union’s finances). 
 286. Among other things, the union is arguing that there was a labor dispute such 
that the heightened standard should have applied regardless of whether the 
statements were made about a non-primary employer and regardless of whether the 
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3. Hughes 
In Hughes v. Northern California Carpenters Regional Council,288 the 
state trial and appellate courts determined that the NLRA defamation 
defense should not be applied to allegedly defamatory statements 
made during a labor dispute.289  Hughes involved a union engaged in 
an area standards labor dispute with a drywall subcontractor.290  
During the labor dispute, the union distributed a handbill that 
referenced the labor dispute generally291 and made a statement that 
the subcontractor had committed a crime (by allegedly exposing 
himself to the picketers) and was a danger to children.292  Instead of 
applying the NLRA defamation defense and the defense’s 
heightened standard of proof, the appellate court determined that 
the defense did not apply because the statements would not be 
protected by NLRA section 8(a).293  The court said: 
The flyer was a personal attack on Hughes himself, seeking to 
portray him as someone who engaged in sex crimes and posed a 
sexual danger to children.  It was not relevant to the Union’s area 
standards picketing or any labor dispute, nor was it regarding an 
                                                          
statements had content discussing something other than working conditions and the 
primary labor dispute.  Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening Brief, supra note 279,  
at 10. 
 287. Various documents have been filed in relation to the appeal.  Respondent’s 
Brief in Answer to Amici Curiae Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009), 
2009 WL 1346661; Appellant UNITE HERE’s Reply Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 22, 2009), 2009 WL 480320; Respondent’s Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2008), 2008 WL 2478283. 
 288. No. A112272, 2007 WL 1448746 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007). 
 289. Id. at *3, *6. 
 290. Id. at *1.  The union believed Hughes was paying wages that were “less than 
an ‘area standard’ figure published by the State of California.”  Id.  As the court 
described, “[T]he Union was not attempting to organize the workers at Hughes 
Drywall, but was instead engaged in ‘area standards’ picketing.”  Id. at *5. 
 291. One side of the flyer mentioned the “ongoing dispute” and the union’s 
picketing at Hughes.  Id. at *5 n.6. 
 292. Id. at *2–3.  The events preceding the defamation suit were heated.  On one 
occasion, while the union was picketing outside of Hughes Drywall, Hughes “held a 
union jacket in front of his groin and pretended to urinate on it.”  Id. at *2.  There 
was a factual dispute as to whether Hughes “actually expose[d] himself during the 
incident.”  Id.  As the court explained, 
Two of [Hughes’s employees and his son] also testified that Hughes did not 
expose himself during the incident.  The picketers had a different view.   
[A union member] testified that he was on the picket line that day,  
and saw Hughes remove his penis from his pants and rub it on the Union  
jacket. . . .  [A]nother picketer, saw Hughes partially unzip his pants and rub 
the Union jacket on his crotch. 
Id.  Not long after a union representative reported the incident to the police, 
“Hughes again attempted to express his views of the Union by lowering his pants and 
‘mooning’ the picketers,” stating “kiss my ass.”  Id.  The union used a copy of the 
police report regarding the incident to prepare a flyer that it distributed to the 
public and to businesses in the area.  Id. 
 293. Id. at *6. 
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issue conceivably subject to the protections of [section] 7 or the 
prohibitions of [section] 8 of the [NLRA].294 
While the outcome of the jury trial was affirmed on appeal by the 
state’s highest court, the $1.5 million award was reduced to 
approximately $650,000.295 
These three case studies demonstrate the hazards of revising NLRA 
preemption theory in such a way that it would increase state law 
adjudication of whether NLRA sections 8(a) and 8(b) protect or 
prohibit certain allegedly defamatory statements.  Such adjudication 
is more complex than the inquiry called for by current doctrine.  
Widely accepted current doctrine merely asks state courts to 
adjudicate whether the allegedly defamatory statements were made 
during labor disputes.  Of course, it is unknown whether the trial 
outcomes in these cases would have been different if the trial courts 
had applied the NLRA defamation defense.  Nonetheless, the failure 
to apply the NLRA defamation defense meant that the jury evaluated 
the defamation claims based on the less exacting, and therefore more 
plaintiff-friendly, state law standards of proof.  Thus, these cases 
illustrate that a simple application of the continuum proposal would 
likely reduce the frequency with which the NLRA defamation defense 
is applied.  It may therefore unintentionally deteriorate the NLRA 
defamation defense and stunt its potential to protect new forms of 
collective activity. 
A less often cited aspect of the continuum proposal acknowledges 
that states should be “free to regulate labor relations, in parallel with 
the NLRA and beyond, except where state law conflicts with an 
interest protected by the NLRA.”296  Defamation law is one of the 
areas that potentially conflicts with an essential interest protected by 
the NLRA:  that of free speech during a labor dispute.  To avoid 
conflict with the NLRA’s free speech policies, the NLRA’s 
preemption doctrine should not be narrowed in such a way that 
would direct courts to engage in “arguably protected or prohibited 
by” inquiries on a case-by-case basis.  Such a doctrine threatens to 
chill speech297 and interfere with the NLRA’s underlying purpose of 
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Damages, BNA DAILY LABOR REP., May 25, 2007, at A3. 
 296. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 426 (emphasis added). 
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protecting collective activity by protecting less egregious defamatory 
speech from the reach of state defamation law.298  Instead, future 
proposals should take care to retain the NLRA defamation defense 
and its mandate that courts consider only whether an allegedly 
defamatory statement was made during a labor dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with Congressional intent, the NLRA defamation 
defense has promoted speech and collective activity among 
employees for their mutual aid and protection.  In this way, the 
NLRA’s freedom of speech policies allow some “freedom to defame,” 
albeit only with respect to less egregious forms of defamation.  
Speech is undoubtedly an important outlet that allows workers and 
their organizations to innovate in the face of new challenges.  
Moreover, while many aspects of the NLRA are beleaguered and out 
of step with modern workplace relations,299 the defamation defense 
provides the NLRA with some potential to remain relevant in the 
context of new challenges, new worker organizations, and new 
worker organizing strategies.300  It is still too early to put the final nail 
in the NLRA’s coffin. 
                                                          
voice and participation in certain geographic areas, but is not a particularly 
promising avenue for the country as a whole.”). 
 298. In this way, this Article joins existing literature that is similarly skeptical about 
the prospects of state involvement in labor relations.  See generally Jeffrey Hirsch, 
Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. 225 (2008). 
 299. See Gould, supra note 221, at 668 (“The Act has done a less than stellar job in 
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